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Prescription for Compromise: Maintaining Adequate 
Pharmacist Care Contraindicates Imposition of a 
General Duty to Warn 
Jaclyn Casey* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts traditionally have imposed no duty upon pharmacists to 
warn patients of the adverse effects of prescription drugs.1 However, 
professional progression and tort litigation have chipped away 
steadily at this no-duty rule,2 spurring a new trend where courts hold 
pharmacists liable for failing to warn patients3 on either a defective- 
or inadequate-warning theory.4 
This trend abrogates the Learned Intermediary Doctrine5 (the 
Doctrine) embodied in the Restatement (Third) of Torts.6 The 
Learned Intermediary Doctrine provides that the prescribing 
physician is the “learned intermediary” between the drug 
manufacturer and the patient. As such, the prescribing physician is in 
the best position to assess the danger of a prescription drug to a 
patient because the physician knows the patient’s needs and can 
evaluate the drug’s effects and contraindications in light of those 
 1. See David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Liability of Pharmacist Who Accurately Fills 
Prescription for Harm Resulting to User, 44 A.L.R. 5th 393 (2002). 
 2. See Carol Ukens, Community Practice, Florida Judge Rules on Pharmacist Duty to 
Warn, DRUG TOPICS, Apr. 7, 2003, at 24. 
 3. Id. Courts now may require pharmacists to warn patients of the harmful effects of 
prescription drugs. 
 4. See Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Civil Liability of Pharmacists or Druggists for 
Failure to Warn of Potential Drug Interactions in Use of Prescription Drug, 79 A.L.R. 5th 409 
(2003). 
 5. See Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of Learned-
Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R. 5th 127 (1998). 
 6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d) & cmt. b, reporters’ note to 
cmts. b, d (1998). 
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needs.7 Thus, the physician becomes responsible for warning the 
patient and passing on instructions or warnings provided by the drug 
manufacturer.8 This doctrinal structure precludes manufacturer 
liability for defective warning.9 
Traditionally, the Doctrine also shielded pharmacists from 
negligence liability.10 The modern trend, however, holds pharmacists 
liable for negligence if they fail to warn patients of a prescription 
drug’s adverse effects.11 While several theories support pharmacist 
liability,12 imposing such liability may have fatal effects on the 
efficiency and efficacy of “pharmacist care” given pharmacists’ 
precarious position in the health care system and the increasing 
demand for prescriptions.13 
These effects include the practice of pharmacy’s professional 
regression and the inability of pharmacists to provide heightened 
care.14 Imposing liability on pharmacists in this fashion encourages 
 7. “[P]hysicians are best situated to assess patients’ needs for medication, so they alone 
should have a duty to warn about potential drug interactions.” Porto, supra note 4, § 2a, at 414. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Walls v. Alpharma USPD, Inc., No. 1010645, 2004 Ala. LEXIS 40 (Ala. 
Mar. 5, 2004). “[W]e rely on the expertise of the physician intermediary to bridge the gap in 
special cases where the product and related warning are sufficiently complex so as to not be 
fully appreciated by the consumer.” Id. at *4. 
 Under strict products liability, minimally effective drugs with extreme side effects may still 
be pursued under a defective-design theory rather than a failure-to-warn theory and would not 
be affected by application of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine. See discussion infra note 45. 
 10. See Karina Fox, Note, A Weighty Issue: Will Pharmacists Survive the Fen-Phen 
Feeding Frenzy? Kohl v. American Home Products Corporation and a Pharmacist’s Duty to 
Warn of the Dangers of Prescription Drugs, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1349, 1357 (2001). 
 11. See, e.g., Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 517–18 (Ind. 1994) 
(finding a duty to warn in the pharmacist-patient relationship). 
 12. Some policy concerns that courts evaluate are preservation of the physician-patient 
relationship, prevention of drug related injuries, and avoidance of unnecessary costs. See id. 
 13. “Pharmacist care” in this Note refers generally to the services pharmacists provide 
patients including dispensing of medication, counseling and drug therapy assessment. The 
National Community Pharmacists Association (NCPA) defines Pharmacist Care® as “a 
comprehensive approach to pharmacist-directed patient care management through which 
community pharmacists provide an expanded level of patient care that focuses on disease 
prevention and wellness and includes monitoring, evaluating, counseling, intervening, and 
directing medication-related therapies to enhance patient care and improve health outcomes.” 
NCPA, About NIPCO, at http://www.ncpanet.org/nipco/about_nipco.shtml (last visited Sept. 
29, 2004). The National Institute for Pharmacist Care Outcomes (NIPCO) “is the national 
accrediting organization for pharmacist care education and training programs leading to the 
pharmacist care Diplomate credential.” Id. 
 14. See discussion infra Part III.B.  
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pharmacists to act contrary to public policy to prevent negative 
ramifications on society and the practice of pharmacy, by operating 
on a virtual “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy15 or closing up shop 
altogether. Obviously, this type of behavior harms the public 
welfare.16  
Given the critical and delicate balance between effective and 
affordable health care in the United States,17 the Learned 
Intermediary Doctrine must continue to apply conventionally to 
prescribing physicians,18 shielding pharmacists from certain liability. 
Instituting a modified general no-duty rule may be the compromise 
between the traditional approach and the modern trend that the 
system needs.19 
 15. Strict-products-liability defective-warning cases achieve the same goal as negligence 
defective-warning cases: incentivizing optimal levels of safety. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998). Accordingly, in the rare situation where a pharmacist 
has no real or constructive knowledge of the dangers of a prescription drug for a particular 
patient, he cannot be held liable for failing to warn the patient about those dangers because such 
liability would not help achieve the stated goal. Presumably, then, if pharmacists refuse to ask 
patients about their medical history (don’t ask), they would not be liable for failing to warn 
(don’t tell) in either strict liability or negligence because they do not have the requisite 
knowledge. Furthermore, courts generally do not impose strict liability on pharmacists, finding 
that pharmacists are service providers rather than retail sellers of drugs. See, e.g., McLeod v. 
W.S. Merrell Co., 167 So. 2d 901, 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). 
 16. Recognition of a pharmacist’s duty to warn in certain situations may further society’s 
interest in preventing the use and misuse of prescription drugs. See Hooks Super X, Inc. v. 
McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ind. 1994) (recognizing the pharmacist’s duty to further 
society’s goal of preventing the overuse and misuse of prescription drugs). Moreover, the 
checks-and-balances relationship between prescribing physicians and dispensing pharmacists 
provides more opportunity to find and correct errors in prescriptions or to recognize possible 
contraindications. See Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1134 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (advocating pharmacists’ new role as prescription “gatekeepers”); 
Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 435 (Tenn. 1994) (recognizing pharmacy’s duty to 
warn of a drug’s dangerous propensities when no warning had been given by the physician). 
 17. See generally Jeanne Schulte Scott, Universal Health Care Revisited, HEALTHCARE 
FIN. MGMT., June 1999, at 32. Imposing liability on any industry increases the cost of 
production and that cost is ultimately passed on to the consumer. As cost increases, health care 
becomes less available to lower-income individuals. Our health care law seeks a balance 
between adequate treatment and easy access to medical services. As of 1999, forty-four million 
Americans did not have health insurance, which demonstrates the instability of the system. Id. 
 18. This Note does not discuss possible theories of liability for failure to warn that may 
apply to manufacturers of prescription drugs. A different analysis applies to cases involving 
direct-to-consumer advertising or lifestyle drugs, for example. In such cases, the Learned 
Intermediary Doctrine may not apply to shield manufacturers from liability. 
 19. See discussion infra Part IV.  
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In Part II of this Note, I first examine the policy behind the 
Doctrine’s application to the manufacturer-physician-patient 
relationships and its more recent application in prescription drug 
cases. I then discuss the application of the Doctrine to the physician-
pharmacist-patient relationship by examining: the public policy 
involved in such application, the reasons why courts vitiate such 
application, the cases imposing liability on pharmacists for failing to 
fulfill their traditional duty to dispense medications accurately, the 
modern approach to pharmacist liability, the cases imposing a duty to 
warn on pharmacists, and the legislative and regulatory authority 
behind the pharmacist’s expanded professional duties. Finally, I 
address cases in which courts have imposed no general duty to warn 
on pharmacists. 
In Part III, I analyze the negative impact of the duty to warn. I 
discuss how the duty abrogates the Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
and how it may have severe consequences on the health care industry 
by limiting pharmacists’ care. The duty forces pharmacists to over-
emphasize risks to compensate for potential liability, interferes with 
the physician-patient relationship, and increases the cost of health 
care. 
Part IV advocates that courts subject pharmacists to negligence 
liability only upon voluntary assumption of a duty to warn. 
Furthermore, Part IV advocates that when such a duty is implied, 
pharmacists ought to be held to a professional standard of care.  
Part V concludes that imposing liability on pharmacists for failing 
to warn about adverse effects of prescription drugs endangers the 
equilibrium of the health care system and the physician-patient 
relationship. Following the proposed approach to pharmacist liability 
strikes a balance between traditional common law and modern legal 
trends.20 
 20. The no-duty rule should only pertain to pharmacists’ traditional duties. If a pharmacist 
affirmatively assumes a duty not traditionally imposed on him, he may face liability for 
negligent fulfillment of that assumed duty. See discussion infra Parts II.B.2.b.3 and IV. 
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II. DEVELOPMENT 
A. Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
1. Origin and Authority of the Doctrine 
Ordinarily, strict products liability law imposes a duty on the 
manufacturer of a product to warn consumers of the inherent dangers 
in using its product.21 Failing to comply with this duty makes that 
product defective and subjects the manufacturer to liability for the 
defect.22 However, prescription drugs are treated differently.23 
The Learned Intermediary Doctrine shields drug manufacturers 
from liability and relieves them of the duty to warn patients, if they 
warn prescribing physicians of the drug’s dangers.24 Physicians, in 
 21. “One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or 
distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by 
the defect.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998). The Restatement also 
provides that “[a] product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it . . . is defective 
because of inadequate instructions or warnings.” Id. § 2. 
A product . . . is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by 
the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, 
or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.  
Id. § 2(c). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Prescription drugs are classified as unavoidably unsafe products because they 
inevitably harm some patients while healing others. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 
478 (Cal. 1988). Consequently, prescription drugs are not “defective” if “properly prepared and 
accompanied by proper directions and warnings. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A 
cmt. k (1965). 
 24. See id. § 
 (a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who sells or otherwise 
distributes a defective drug or medical device is subject to liability for harm to persons 
caused by the defect . . . . 
 (b) [A] prescription drug or medical device is defective if at the time of sale or other 
distribution the drug or medical device . . . 
 (3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings as 
defined in Subsection (d) . . . . 
 (d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate 
instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable 
risks of harm are not provided to . . . prescribing and other health-care providers who 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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turn, must warn patients of the dangers of the drugs they prescribe.25 
Almost all states have adopted the Doctrine and some have even 
codified it.26 
2. Policy Reasons Supporting the Doctrine 
In the past, courts applied the Learned Intermediary Doctrine with 
confidence because of the physician’s unique ability to accurately 
weigh the potential risks of prescribing a drug against the drug’s 
benefits to a patient.27 Courts assumed that the physician was in a far 
better position than the patient to understand a drug’s complexities as 
well as the pharmaceutical industry’s esoteric terminology and to 
translate that knowledge into something a patient could understand.28 
Courts also assumed that the physician was in a better position than 
the drug manufacturer to know the individual needs and 
idiosyncrasies of the patient.29 Finally, courts found that direct 
consumer warnings may scare patients from taking drugs-patients 
may give too much weight to frighteningly candid instructions meant 
to shield manufacturers from liability and choose not to take a 
are in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or 
warnings. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (1998). The comments to this section 
recognize that “the obligation of a manufacturer to warn about risks attendant to the use of 
drugs . . . traditionally has required warnings directed to health-care providers and not to 
patients.” Id. at cmt. b. 
 25. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1125 (Ill. 2002) (explaining that 
under the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, manufacturers have a duty to warn physicians and 
physicians have a duty to convey those warnings to their patients). 
 26. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5(c) (2003) (“[N]o manufacturer or seller of a 
prescription drug shall be liable in a products liability action for failing to provide a warning or 
instruction directly to the consumer if an adequate warning or instruction has been provided to 
the physician.”). 
 27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (1998) (“[O]nly 
health-care providers are in a position to understand the significance of the risks involved and to 
assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of a given form of prescription-based 
therapy.”). 
 28. Walls v. Alpharma USPD, Inc., No. 1010645, 2004 Ala. LEXIS 40 *1, *6–7 (Ala. 
Mar. 5, 2004). 
 29. See Schaerrer v. Stewart’s Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79 P.3d 922 (Utah 2003) (finding the 
physician to be the “best conduit” for warnings from the manufacturer because of his 
combination of medical training and “individual understanding of the patient’s needs”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/11
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particular drug when it is in their best interest to do so.30 A physician 
may be able to explain away the patient’s concerns.31  
But the health care system is changing and the premises that 
courts rested their opinions on are changing as well. For instance, as 
the liquidity of the health care system increases,32 the physician’s 
knowledge of the patient’s entire health situation decreases.33 Patients 
often see multiple doctors and it is rare that any one of these doctors 
will know about any or all of the patient’s other doctors.34 And 
because the patient may not willingly reveal their whole medical 
picture, physicians sometimes prescribe a medication without 
comprehensive knowledge of the medication’s risks for that patient.35  
Moreover, manufacturers are now advertising directly to 
consumers,36 and it is unclear whether these manufacturers have a 
 30. See In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d 873, 883 (Mich. 1984) (discussing further 
policy reasons for salvation of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine). There are additional 
theoretical bases for the Learned Intermediary Doctrine as well: 
[P]hysicians may be in a superior position to convey meaningful information to their 
patients, as they must do to satisfy their duty to secure informed consent. . . . Finally, 
because of the complexity of risk information about prescription drugs, comprehension 
problems would complicate any effort by manufacturers to translate physician labeling 
for lay patients. 
Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and 
Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 158–59 (1992). According to a study sponsored by the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “sixty-nine percent of patients said they would be concerned 
about taking a drug after reading packaging information about possible serious side effects, 
while 20 percent would avoid taking the drug altogether.” Lawsuits Dramatically Erode Drug 
Sales, DRUG INDUS. DAILY, July 16, 2003. 
 31. See In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d at 883 (reasoning that package inserts or 
other forms of direct consumer warning, read without the keen medical eye of a physician, may 
upset even the “most sophisticated patient”); Landsell v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 1999 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22540, at *1, *16–17 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 26, 1999) (imposing a duty to warn would 
interfere with the physician-patient relationship); Noah, supra note 30, at 157–59 (“[C]ourts do 
not wish to intrude upon the doctor-patient relationship . . . warnings that contradict information 
supplied by the physician will undermine the patient’s trust in the physician’s judgment.”). 
 32. More frequently than ever, patients are free to see multiple doctors for any number of 
ailments. It is rare that only one physician will treat any given patient. See Jill Casson Owen, 
Note, The Pharmacist’s Duty to Warn: Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, 37 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 677, 697 (1995). 
 33. See David B. Brushwood, The Professional Capabilities and Legal Responsibilities of 
Pharmacists: Should “Can” Imply “Ought”?, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 439, 441–42 (1996). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Owen, supra note 32. 
 36. Manufacturers started marketing directly to consumers in the 1980s, beginning with 
the Upjohn Company’s Rogaine campaign. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 
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duty to warn.37 This direct advertising adds yet another obstacle to 
the already complicated physician-patient relationship because 
patients now “enter offices with ‘preconceived expectations about 
treatment.’”38 
But imposing liability on a drug manufacturer for a failure to warn 
is not the answer. This will only discourage valuable prescription 
drug research and development and dramatically increase the cost of 
these drugs for the consuming public.39 Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers must undertake a costly and lengthy research 
application process to market and distribute a legal drug.40 This 
process may cost the manufacturer as much as $800 million,41 
without accounting for civil defense costs. Excessive litigation could 
1251 (N.J. 1999); W. John Thomas, Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Catalyst 
for a Change in the Therapeutic Model in Psychotherapy?, 32 CONN. L. REV. 209, 210–11 
(2000). From 1996 to 2000, spending on direct-to-consumer advertising more than tripled, 
rising from $791 million to nearly $2.5 billion. Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Promotion of 
Prescription Drugs to Consumers, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 498, 499–501 (2002). 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. e (1998). 
 38. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1260 (quoting Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription 
Drug Advertising, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 157 (1999)). “Physicians complain that it is 
impossible to compete with pharmaceutical companies’ massive advertising budgets and resign 
themselves to the fact that if consumers make enough noise, they will eventually relent to 
patient pressure.” Terzian, supra, at 158 (footnotes omitted). Not surprisingly, some courts have 
held that “neither the physician nor the manufacturer should be entirely relieved of their 
respective duties to warn” in these direct marketing cases. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1262–63. 
Requiring the manufacturer to warn the patient/consumer directly also raises questions as to the 
adequacy of the warning. These issues ordinarily do not arise when warnings are directed only 
at learned intermediaries. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 442 (4th ed, 2000); see also MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. 
Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985). 
 39. Brown, 751 P.2d at 479. Some commentators argue that slowing down the 
pharmaceutical creation and certification process is a good thing and prevents harmful drugs 
like Ephedra from slipping through the cracks. But this same delay may also prevent beneficial 
research and development. 
 40. A benefit of this application process is that compliance with FDA regulations raises a 
rebuttable presumption of adequacy of the warning to the learned intermediary. In re Meridia 
Products Liability Litigation, 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 812 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Perez v. Wyeth Lab., 
734 A.2d 1245, 1259 (N.J. 1999). 
 41. Ceci Connolly, Price Tag for a New Drug: $802 Million; Findings of Tufts University 
Study Are Disputed by Several Watchdog Groups, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2001, at A10. 
However, cash outlay maybe far less-an average of $107.6 million pre-tax. Rx R&D Myths: The 
Case Against the Drug Industry’s R&D “Scare Card”, PUB. CITIZEN, July 2001, at 6, available 
at http://www.citizen.org/documents/acfdc.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2004). 
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cripple the industry. These reasons, among others, support 
affirmation of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine.42 
B. Pharmacists’ Liability for Failure to Warn and the Learned 
Intermediary Doctrine 
1. Strict Liability 
Courts typically refuse to impose liability on pharmacists under 
strict products liability law.43 They reason that such a result would 
not further public policy interests in the prescription drug context 
because the pharmacist exercises no control over the drug company44 
and cannot prevent the company from manufacturing harmful 
drugs.45 Hence, imposing strict liability on a pharmacist punishes the 
pharmacist for something he cannot prevent.46 
 42. See discussion infra Part III. 
 43. See, e.g., Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Pa. 1991); see also 
Steven W. Huang, The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990: Redefining Pharmacists’ Legal 
Responsibilities, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 417, 421 (1998) (noting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402A cmt. k as support for the courts’ positions). 
 44. This assumes that the pharmacist is not a managed care pharmacist. Managed care 
organizations attempt to control health care costs by centralizing health care decisions and 
restricting physicians’ treatment choices in part by using drug formularies—approved lists. 
Pharmacists help make drug formulary decisions and thus may have some impact on drug 
manufacturers in this scenario. See Richard M. Cooper, Some Effects of the Clinton Health Care 
Reform Proposals on Regulated Aspects of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 24 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1260 (1993); John D. Jones, How a PBM Develops Its Drug Formulary, DRUG BENEFIT 
TRENDS, June 1998, at 37. 
 45. See In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“One 
of the purposes of imposing strict liability or liability for breach of warranty on retailers is to 
encourage retailers to pressure manufacturers to make safer products. Yet this goal is lost on 
pharmacists, who have little or no impact on a manufacturer’s marketing of prescription 
drugs.”). Physicians, however, have a far more direct impact on manufacturers through their 
ability to select particular drugs to prescribe to their patients. 
 46. See Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 253 (Cal. 1985). The court 
rejected the application of strict liability to pharmacists on several public policy reasons: if 
pharmacists were held strictly liable, they might try to avoid dispensing any drug that posed 
even a remote risk of harm “although such medications may be essential to the health or even 
the survival of patients”; pharmacists may feel compelled to choose expensive drugs from 
established manufacturers to ensure a pharmacy receives maximum protection from suit; 
because the physician who prescribes the drug and the manufacturer who produces the drug 
may be able to avoid strict liability, it would be “unfair and burdensome” to impose that 
liability on pharmacists who only provides drugs on a physician’s order. Id. at 253; see also 
Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (predicting that the 
imposition of strict liability on pharmacists would cause them to be insurers of a drug’s safety, 
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2. Negligence 
In recent years, industry demands have required pharmacists to do 
far more than accurately fill a prescription.47 These new duties expose 
pharmacists to liability in negligence for taking actions or failing to 
take actions that are outside the scope of their traditional duties.48 
Here, while most courts still apply the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine,49 the trend is changing50 and the pharmacist is becoming 
more susceptible to liability for failure to warn patients of a 
prescription drug’s harm.51  
a. Pharmacists’ Traditional Liability 
Pharmacists traditionally are held to a high standard of care in 
dispensing medication because of the consequences of even a 
requiring additional testing and costs that would pass onto the consumer and be harmful rather 
than beneficial to society). 
 Plaintiffs in prescription drug cases also pursue pharmacists for failing to warn under the 
Uniform Commercial Code and a theory of express or implied warranty of merchantability. See, 
e.g., Rezulin, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 286. Most courts decline to find pharmacists liable for breach 
of express or implied warranties for the same reasons that they reject imposition of strict 
liability. Id. at 292; see also Presto v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 487 S.E.2d 70, 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1998); Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1383 (Pa. 1991); supra note 45 and 
text accompanying notes 43–45. Because pharmacists do not manufacture prescription drugs 
and do not prescribe a particular course of drug therapy for a patient, they cannot be required to 
warranty the drugs without being able to inspect each drug for fitness or to evaluate the 
patient’s drug therapy. It would be impossible for pharmacists to perform a chemical analysis 
on each pill they count. 
 47. These requirements include counseling patients about drug therapy and warning them 
of adverse effects of prescription drugs. 
 48. Traditionally, the pharmacist’s only duty was to accurately fill a valid prescription. 
Huang, supra note 43, at 428. 
 49. The District Court for the Southern District of New York found that “[a]lmost every 
state confronted with the question has declined to impose on pharmacists a duty to warn of 
intrinsic dangers of prescription drugs . . . these states have not limited their holdings for failure 
to warn claims but have shielded pharmacists from liability on theories of strict liability and 
breach of warranty as well.” Rezulin, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (footnote omitted). 
 50. See, e.g., Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, 880 P.2d 1129, 1129 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1994); Hooks Super X, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514,514 (Ind. 1994); Dooley v. 
Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 51. See R. Paul Asbury, Comment, Pharmacist Liability: The Doors of Litigation Are 
Opening, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 907 (2000) (examining the expansion in pharmacist 
liability and advocating that pharmacists be scrutinized as professionals under the law). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/11
p287 Casey book pages.doc  3/29/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Prescription for Compromise 297 
 
 
 
miniscule error.52 This standard of care is heavily enforced by 
courts,53 which require, as a minimum, that a pharmacist accurately 
fill a prescription and ensure that the prescription is not 
contaminated.54 Courts will not tolerate any lapse in judgment no 
matter how honest the error.55 
Courts also require pharmacists to recognize clear errors in 
prescriptions such as “lethal dosages, inadequate instructions . . . and 
incompatible prescriptions.”56 A pharmacist must verify the 
prescription with the prescribing physician when a prescription drug 
is facially and recognizably incorrect.57 
However, the courts do not impose a duty upon the pharmacist to 
warn the patient of contraindications or side effects; such a duty 
would invoke the Learned Intermediary Doctrine. For instance, a 
Texas court of appeals found that a pharmacist had “no generalized 
duty to warn patients of potential adverse reactions to prescription 
drugs” in Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.58 The court found the 
traditional Learned Intermediary Doctrine applicable, reasoning that 
it is the physician’s duty to warn the patient of a drug’s negative 
effects, not the pharmacist.59 The Washington Supreme Court has 
also held that a pharmacist has no duty to warn the patient of the 
adverse side effects of a particular prescription drug.60 The court 
relied on the Learned Intermediary Doctrine and limited the 
pharmacist’s duty to filling prescriptions, noticing clear errors in 
those prescriptions, and attempting to correct those errors.61 Missouri 
 52. Marchitelli, supra note 1, at § 2a; see also Huang, supra note 43. 
 53. Pharmacists have been found liable for “mistakes . . . in filling of a prescription, sale 
of substances other than those requested by . . . prescribing physicians, mislabeling the contents 
of a prescription container . . . and violation of explicit statutory . . . requirements dealing with 
the practice of pharmacy.” Marchitelli, supra note 1, at § 2a (footnotes omitted). 
 54. See Johnson v. Walgreen Co., 675 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 55. See Huang, supra note 43, at 428; see also Brushwood, supra note 33, at 439. 
 56. Huang, supra note 43, at 429. 
 57. Id.; see also Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) 
(finding that a pharmacist breached his duty to exercise due care by failing to “warn the patient 
or notify the prescribing physician of the obvious inadequacies appearing on the face of the 
prescription”). 
 58. 30 S.W.3d 455, 469 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). 
 59. Id. The court clarified that it did “not imply that pharmacists may not warn patients” 
but “that pharmacists are not legally obligated to do so.” Id. 
 60. McKee v. Am. Home Prod. Corp. 782 P.2d 1045, 1055–56 (Wash. 1989). 
 61. Id. at 1049–53. 
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also followed this rule until 1999.62 In Kampe v. Howard Stark 
Professional Pharmacy, Inc.,63 the Missouri Court of Appeals held 
that “[b]y properly filling legal prescriptions that contained no 
apparent discrepancies on their face, the pharmacy fulfilled its duty 
to” the patient.64 The court refused to impose liability on a pharmacist 
to warn of the adverse effects of a prescription drug.65 
b. Pharmacists’ Modern Liability 
Modern courts are beginning to recognize pharmacists’ 
heightened place in the health care industry66 and to hold them to a 
professional standard of care—the standard of care, skill and 
intelligence, which ordinarily characterizes the profession.67 Under 
this modern approach, it is much easier for courts to create duties and 
impose liability on pharmacists, including liability for failure to warn. 
 62. The Missouri Court of Appeals explicitly overruled the traditional rule in Horner v. 
Spalitto. 1 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
 63. 841 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
 64. Id. at 227. 
 65. Id. at 226. The court refused to interpret section 338.010 of the Revised Statutes of 
Missouri as setting forth the duties of a pharmacist, relegating that section of the statute to 
definitional purposes only. Id. The court also rejected application to the case of 
section 338.015.2, which states: “All pharmacists may provide pharmaceutical consultation and 
advise to persons concerning the safe and therapeutic use of their prescription drugs” (emphasis 
added). Id. at 226. The court reasoned that the use of “may” in the statute allowed for discretion 
on the part of the pharmacist. Id. at 226. The court also found the standards imposed by the 
American Pharmaceutical Association to be insufficient, as non-legal authorities, to impose a 
legal duty on pharmacists. Id.; see also Samuel H. Kalman & John F. Schlegel, Standards of 
Practice for the Profession of Pharmacy, AM. PHARMACY, Mar. 1979, at 21. Despite the age of 
the standards, they have not been revised. 
 66. See Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ind. 1994); Pittman v. 
UpJohn Co., 890 S.W. 2d 425,435 (Tenn. 1994) 
 67. See, e.g., Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, 880 P.2d 1129, 1132–33 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1994). The Arizona Court of Appeals noted: 
Health care providers and other professionals . . . are held to a higher standard of care 
than that of the ordinary prudent person when the alleged negligence involves the 
defendant’s area of expertise. . . . [T]he standard is based on “the usual conduct of 
other members of the defendant’s profession in similar circumstances” . . . . We 
impose this higher standard of care upon pharmacists because they are professionals in 
the health care area.  
Id. (quoting Bell v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 755 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)). 
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 (1) Knowledge Creates Duty 
Courts may impose a duty to warn on a pharmacist if the 
pharmacist is aware or should be aware of additional information 
about a particular patient, such as that patient’s prescription drug 
consumption. This duty originated long ago in cases like Fuhs v. 
Barber,68 where a pharmacist recommended that a patient take a drug 
other than that prescribed by her physician which resulted in the 
patient’s injury.69 Similarly, the Supreme Court of New York held a 
pharmacist liable for failure to warn a known alcoholic patient 
against a drug’s contraindication to alcohol in Hand v. Krakowski.70 
The court found that the pharmacist’s failure to warn violated his 
duty of ordinary care.71 Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court has 
found that pharmacists with certain knowledge have a duty to warn. 
In Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.72 the defendant pharmacy knew of 
the patient’s allergy to aspirin, but dispensed to her a drug that was 
specifically contraindicated for patients with an aspirin allergy.73 The 
court stated that a factually specific “duty to warn exists where . . . a 
pharmacy has patient-specific information about drug allergies, and 
knows that the drug being prescribed is contraindicated for the 
individual patient. In such instances, a pharmacy has a duty to warn 
either the prescribing physician or the patient of the potential 
danger.”74 
Courts will also impose a duty to warn on a pharmacist if the 
pharmacist is aware that a drug has particularly addictive 
propensities. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court, held that a 
pharmacist had a duty to warn of the addictive nature of a 
 68. 36 P.2d 962 (Kan. 1934). 
 69. “The court explained that pharmacists must act with extreme caution and prudence 
when instructing customers as to the use of their compounds . . . in such circumstances, even 
the slightest negligence may subject the pharmacist to liability.” Huang, supra note 43, at 432 
(discussing Fuhs v. Barber, 36 P.2d 962, 964 (1934)). 
 70. 453 N.Y.S.2d 121, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
 71. Id. 
 72. 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1129 (Ill. 2002). 
 73. Id. at 1120. 
 74. Id. at 1129. The court relied heavily on the facts of the case, including the fact that the 
pharmacy computer system must have been manually overridden to allow the drug to be 
dispensed and such manual override first requires contacting a physician to confirm the 
prescription, which did not happen. Id. at 1121. 
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prescription drug in Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, 
Inc.75 The court reasoned that the pharmacist owed the patient a “duty 
of reasonable care” and that drug counseling fell within that 
reasonable duty.76 
 (2) Duty of Reasonable Care 
Many courts also hold pharmacists to a judicially imposed 
standard of care. For instance, in Dooley v. Everett,77 the Tennessee 
Court of Appeals found a violation of a pharmacist’s duty of care 
where the defendant pharmacy gave no warning to the physician or to 
the patient that a drug it dispensed was contraindicated for the asthma 
medication the patient was taking.78 The court relied on an affidavit 
of a practicing pharmacist to determine the pharmacy industry’s 
standard of care, which included warning patients of possible drug 
interactions.79 Likewise, in Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy,80 a court 
looked to the professional community to dictate an appropriate 
standard of care.81 In Riff, a pharmacist failed to instruct a patient as 
to the maximum dosage and possible risks of exceeding that dosage.82 
Unaware of the danger associated with the drug, the patient exceeded 
the safe dosage and suffered injury.83 
 75. 880 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). Appellant’s definition of the pharmacist’s 
duty included “a responsibility to advise a customer of the addictive nature of a drug, to warn of 
the hazards of ingesting two or more drugs that adversely interact with one another, and to 
discuss with the physician the addictive nature of a prescribed drug and the dangers of long-
term prescription of the drug.” Id. 
 76. Id. at 1130. 
 77. 805 S.W.2d 380, 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 78. Id. at 382. 
 79. Id. at 382–83, 385–86. 
 80. 508 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). 
 81. Id. at 1250–51. The court determined:  
It is not for this Court to delineate the precise bounds of a medical professional’s 
responsibilities. It is for the medical community to determine what degree of vigilance 
is required in this respect. They are in the best position to balance the interests and 
prescribe a standard of conduct which is consistent with the best interests of the 
patient. 
Id. at 1253. 
 82. Id. at 1247. 
 83. Id. at 1249. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/11
p287 Casey book pages.doc  3/29/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Prescription for Compromise 301 
 
 
 
Missouri courts now adopt the modern approach to pharmacist 
liability. In Horner v. Spalitto,84 a pharmacist filled a patient’s 
prescription for a central nervous system drug at a rate three times the 
regular dose and a prescription for another central nervous system 
drug.85 Because the pharmacist was aware that the first drug’s effects 
were enhanced when taken with other central nervous system drugs, 
he called the prescribing physician before dispensing the drugs and 
the physician affirmed the prescriptions and the doses for the 
pharmacist.86 The court stated that a “duty is an obligation imposed 
by law to conform to a standard of conduct toward another to protect 
others against unreasonable, foreseeable risks”87 and that the 
pharmacist’s duties could extend beyond accurately filling a 
prescription.88 It determined that the pharmacist’s duty changed with 
the circumstances of each particular case, but was always 
commensurate with the care and prudence “which a reasonably 
careful and prudent pharmacist would exercise.”89 The court did not 
determine if the pharmacist actually fulfilled his duty, leaving that 
determination to the jury on remand.90 Instead, it stated that the 
pharmacist’s duty in a particular case may require him to warn 
patients of the adverse effects of drug use.91 This case signals a 
change in the way the Missouri courts view the pharmacist’s duty to 
warn. 
 (3) Assumption of Duty 
Courts sometimes recognize that pharmacists voluntarily assume a 
duty to warn patients when they provide patients with detailed lists of 
warnings or when they advertise. For example, in Cottam v. CVS 
Pharmacy,92 the pharmacy had implemented a computer system 
 84. 1 S.W.3d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
 85. Id. at 520–21. 
 86. Id. at 521. 
 87. Id. at 522 (quoting Hoover’s Dairy Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 
426, 431 (Mo. 1985)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 522–24. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 764 N.E.2d 814 (Mass. 2002). 
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designed to provide its customers with written information about the 
risks and side effects of prescription drugs.93 The court stated that 
when a pharmacy provides a “detailed list of warnings, or, by way of 
advertising, promises to provide customers with information, it may 
thereby undertake a duty to provide complete warnings and 
information.”94 Similarly, in Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc.,95 a 
pharmacy had used a computer system that detected contraindications 
in a patient’s prescription drug use.96 The pharmacy advertised the 
system as one designed to detect harmful drug interactions.97 The 
court found that the pharmacy voluntarily assumed a duty of care 
when it implemented the system and advertised to patients that this 
system would detect harmful drug interactions for its customers.98 
c. Pharmacists’ Statutory Duty 
 (1) OBRA 90 and State “Pharmacy Acts” 
Some courts impose a duty to warn on pharmacists in reaction to 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 90).99 
OBRA 90 expands pharmacists’ traditional role and requires them to 
deliver direct patient care.100 It requires pharmacists to discuss 
potential contraindications and possible interactions and how to avoid 
them with Medicaid patients.101 These requirements constitute 
 93. Id. at 818. 
 94. Id. at 823. 
 95. 544 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). 
 96. Id. at 729. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
OBRA 90 requires pharmacists to become more active in patients’ drug programs through the 
implementation of drug use review (DUR) programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g) (2003). 
 100. Judyth Pendell, The Adverse Side Effects of Pharmaceutical Litigation, AEI-
BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES PUB., Sept. 2003, at 5. 
 101. OBRA 90 requires states to enact legislation imposing more stringent standards for 
pharmacists, including: 
(I) The pharmacist must offer to discuss with each individual receiving benefits under 
this title or caregiver of such individual (in person, whenever practicable, or through 
access to a telephone service which is toll-free for long-distance calls) who presents a 
prescription, matters which in the exercise of the pharmacist’s professional judgment 
(consistent with State law respecting the provision of such information), the 
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additional statutory duties on pharmacists that do not exist in 
common law,102 and while OBRA 90 was designed to only apply to 
pharmacists serving Medicaid patients,103 many states have extended 
OBRA 90 to cover all prescriptions dispensed by pharmacists.104 
Under the operation of each state’s “Pharmacy Act,”105 courts are 
more willing to attach liability to a pharmacist for failure to warn-
even outside the Medicaid realm.106 
 (2) APA Standards 
The American Pharmaceutical Association’s “Standards of 
Practice for the Profession of Pharmacy,”107 which address the 
pharmacist deems significant including the following: 
(aa) The name and description of the medication. 
(bb) The route, dosage form, dosage, route of administration, and duration of drug 
therapy. 
(cc) Special directions and precautions for preparation, administration and use by the 
patient. 
(dd) Common severe side or adverse effects or interactions and therapeutic 
contraindications that may be encountered, including their avoidance, and the action 
required if they occur. 
(ee) Techniques for self-monitoring drug therapy. 
(ff) Proper storage. 
(gg) Prescription refill information. 
(hh) Action to be taken in the event of a missed dose. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). 
 102. Huang, supra note 43, at 434–35. 
 103. Id., see also Owen, supra note 32, at 689. 
 104. See Michael J. Holleran, The Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act of 
1990: Federal Law Shifts the Duty to Warn from the Physician to the Pharmacist, 26 AKRON L. 
REV. 77, 79 (1992) (reasoning that once pharmacists are held to a higher standard for Medicaid 
patients, it would be absurd to hold them to a lower standard of care for non-Medicaid patients). 
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, Puerto Rico, South Carolina and Wyoming were 
the only states or territories as of 1995 that did not require counseling for all patients. Owen, 
supra note 32, at 690 (citing the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, 1994–95 NABP 
Survey of Pharmacy Law). Missouri’s regulation became effective February 26, 1993. MO. 
CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 220-2.190 (2004). 
 105. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs and Controlled Substances § 69 (1964). 
 106. Huang, supra note 43, at 435. For examples of “Pharmacy Acts,” see KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 65-636 (Supp. 2002); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 390-5 (2003). These provisions are also 
known as “Pharmacy Practice Acts,” see, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/3 (2003). 
 107. Kalman, supra note 65. 
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pharmacist’s practice in miniscule detail,108 also place responsibility 
upon the pharmacist to counsel patients about any possible adverse 
effects of prescription drugs.109 Additionally, individual state 
pharmaceutical associations have also adopted model standards of 
conduct which guide the pharmacist’s duties.110 Many courts, 
however, reject the contention that these standards establish a 
pharmacist’s legal duty to warn because they are simply not legal 
authorities.111 
 (3) Missouri Statutory Duties 
Neither Missouri’s statutes nor its regulations limit the 
pharmacist’s extended duties to Medicaid patients.112 And despite the 
 108. Id. The Standards include “responsibilities related to general management and 
administration, processing the prescription, patient care, and education of other health care 
professionals and patients.” Owen, supra note 32, at 691. 
 109. Kalman, supra note 65, at 31. 
 110. See, e.g., Montana Pharmacy Association, Standards of Practice (2003), available at 
http://www.rxmt.org/stndofprac.pdf. Montana’s standards provide that counseling a patient 
should cover the following topics: 
3.1.1.1 Name of the medication 
3.1.1.2 Purpose of the medication 
3.1.1.3 Dosage form 
3.1.2.1 Dosing schedule 
3.1.2.2 Duration of therapy 
3.1.2.3 Special directions 
3.1.2.4 Storage recommendations 
3.1.2.5 Missed dose information 
3.1.2.6 Refill information 
3.1.3.1 Expected outcomes 
3.1.3.2 Precautions 
3.1.3.3 Common possible side effects 
3.1.3.4 Possible interactions 
3.1.3.5 Techniques for self-monitoring. 
Id. § (II)(B)3.1. 
 For information on the Missouri State Board of Pharmacy, see generally http://pr.mo.gov/ 
pharmacists.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
 111. See Adkins v. Mong, 425 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to be 
influenced by non-legal authorities in light of persuasive case law); Kampe v. Howard Stark 
Prof’l Pharmacy, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting the argument that 
non-legal authorities impose legal duties). 
 112. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 338.010–.198 (2003); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 220-
2.010 to -2.900 (2003). 
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permissive language of the statutes,113 the regulations require 
pharmacists to counsel patients and to maintain patient information 
databases.114 These standards have forced a change in the way the 
Missouri courts view the pharmacist’s duty to warn: the courts now 
adopt the modern approach to pharmacist liability.115 
d. No Liability for Failure to Warn 
Some courts continue to reject pharmacist liability for failure to 
warn. For instance, in Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc.,116 the 
court found that in dispensing drugs, a pharmacist had no duty to 
warn.117 And in Adkins v. Mong,118 the Michigan Court of Appeals 
relied on its sister jurisdictions’ consistent rejection of a duty to find 
that pharmacists have no legal duty to intervene in the physician-
patient relationship.119 These courts defend their choice to adhere to 
the traditional no-duty rule through the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine or through public policy. 
 (1) Learned Intermediary Doctrine Applies 
In In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation,120 a New York court 
found that Mississippi’s Learned Intermediary Doctrine applied to 
claims against pharmacies for failing to warn of the dangers 
associated with the drug.121 The Supreme Court of Utah also agrees 
that the Learned Intermediary Doctrine must shield pharmacists to 
 113. See discussion supra note 65. 
 114. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 220-2.190 (2003). Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 
522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
 115. See Horner, 1 S.W.3d at 522 (holding that duty, as a matter of law, is to “exercise the 
care and prudence that a reasonably careful and prudent pharmacist would exercise in the same 
or similar circumstances” and leaving the specific requirements of that duty to the fact-finder). 
 116. 416 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). In Stebbins, the pharmacist failed to warn a 
patient of the sedative side effects of a prescribed medication. Id. at 383. 
 117. Id. at 387–88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). The court relied on other jurisdictions’ refusal to 
impose a duty to warn on pharmacists. Id. 
 118. 453 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
 119. 425 N.W.2d at 154. In Adkins, a defendant pharmacist never warned a patient of the 
addictive nature of the prescription drug and the patient became severely addicted. Id. at 152. 
 120. 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 121. Id. at 288 (applying the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to shield pharmacists from 
liability for failing to warn). 
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preserve its efficacy in products liability law.122 And in Fakhouri v. 
Taylor,123 an Illinois court found no duty to warn even when a 
pharmacist knew the drug dispensed had been prescribed in a 
dangerous quantity.124 Using the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, the 
court found it illogical and unreasonable to impose a greater duty on 
a pharmacist than on the drug’s manufacturer.125 The court also 
refused to find such a duty in the Illinois Pharmacy Act.126 
 (2) Public Policy 
In Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,127 the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania found that public policy precluded the imposition of a 
duty on a pharmacist to warn of risks of drugs that were already 
prescribed.128 Although the plaintiffs alleged that the pharmacist 
should have informed them of the potential birth defects associated 
with an anti-nausea drug used during pregnancy, the court determined 
that such a requirement would undermine the physician-patient 
relationship and violate public policy.129 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Abrogation of Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
The Learned Intermediary Doctrine is founded upon several 
assumptions about the relationship between patients and their 
physicians: physicians can best evaluate a patient’s medical needs 
 122. Schaerrer v. Stewart’s Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79 P.39 922, 929 (Utah 2003). The court 
stated that “so long as a pharmacist’s ability to distribute prescription drugs is limited by the 
highly restricted, FDA-regulated drug distribution system in this country, and a pharmacist 
cannot supply a patient with prescription drugs without an intervening physician’s prescription, 
we will not impose a duty upon the pharmacist to warn of the risks associated with the use of 
prescription drugs.” Id. 
 123. 618 N.E.2d 518 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993). 
 124. Id. at 519. 
 125. Id. at 521. 
 126. Id. at 521–22; see also Pharmacy Practice Act of 1987, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. act 85 
(2004). 
 127. 584 A.2d 1383, 1383 (Pa. 1991). 
 128. Id. at 1386. 
 129. Id. 
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and drug sensitivities,130 patients may wish to participate in the 
decision as to whether or not to take a particular drug and wish to 
discuss that drug’s risks with the physician,131 physicians can provide 
ongoing supervision of the patient’s continued use of the drug,132 and 
physicians are best trained and best positioned to manage possible 
side effects that may occur as a result of taking a particular drug.133 
By creating a pharmacist’s duty to warn, courts undermine the 
Doctrine’s principles because the duty interferes with the physician-
patient relationship134 and damages the quality of pharmacist care.135 
B. Consequences of Duty to Warn 
1. Over-Emphasized Risks 
The application of a duty to warn to pharmacists undoubtedly 
increases their likelihood of being sued. Fear of litigation may incite 
pharmacist defensiveness and trigger an instinct of self-
preservation.136 Consequently, to avoid potential liability, the 
pharmacist may overemphasize the risks and seriousness of side 
effects of the drugs he dispenses.137 Because patients already tend to 
worry about the warnings given to them by health care professionals 
and package inserts,138 adding the pharmacist’s hyperbolic warning to 
 130. Pendell, supra note 100, at 5. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 8. 
 135. Jennifer L. Smith, Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Propriety and 
Consequence of Pharmacists’ Expanding Liability and Duty to Warn, 2002 HOUS. J. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 187, 189 (2002). 
 136. See Pendell, supra note 100, at 9. 
 137. Id. This is supported by statistical data. See Harris Interactive, Pharmaceutical 
Liability Study Report on Findings, July 15, 2003. The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal 
Reform commissioned Harris Interactive to conduct a study among three target populations: 
physicians, pharmacists, and patients. The study centered on the issue of pharmaceutical 
product liability litigation and how it affected each of the three groups. The study is available at 
http://www.legalreformnow.com/resources (last visited Aug. 14, 2004). In fact, two in five 
pharmacists indicate that they over-emphasize the possible side effects of a drug for this very 
reason. Id. 
 138. Pendell, supra note 100, at 9–13 (discussing the effects of pharmaceutical litigation on 
patients); see also Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) 
(finding that patients would be overwhelmed by warnings given by the pharmacist and not take 
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the decision-making process may cause patients to fear a risk that is 
non-existent, and may discourage them from taking a beneficial 
drug.139 
2. Decreased Quality of Care 
An increased workload would erode the quality of the 
pharmacist’s practice.140 The increasing demand on pharmacists 
generates dissatisfaction with the profession, especially with regard 
to the pharmacist’s ability or inability to counsel patients.141 
Furthermore, a pharmacist’s fear of liability will impose an even 
greater demand on the pharmacists, which correlates to errors in 
prescriptions and failure to counsel patients,142 leading to even more 
liability.  
3. Interference in Physician-Patient Relationship 
Imposing a duty to warn on pharmacists interferes with the 
sensitive physician-patient relationship.143 Despite continual changes 
in pharmacist education, pharmacists still lack the education and the 
intimate knowledge of a patient’s entire medical history necessary to 
competently advise the patient of the risks of taking a particular 
drug.144 The duty to warn creates “antagonistic relations between 
the medication prescribed by their doctors). 
 139. Pendell, supra note 100, at 9–13. 
 140. BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE 
PHARMACIST WORKFORCE: A STUDY OF THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR PHARMACISTS 53–56 
(2000), available at ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov//bhpr/nationalcenter/pharmacy/pharmstudy.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2004) [hereinafter THE PHARMACIST WORKFORCE]. Pharmacists now operate out 
of community retail centers and work almost forty-five hours per week filling an average of 182 
prescriptions per day. Id. 
 141. Harris Fleming, Jr., No Rest for the Weary, DRUG TOPICS, June 21, 1999, at 39 
(discussing a Drug Topics/Hospital Pharmacist Report Time/Workload Study). 
 142. THE PHARMACIST WORKFORCE, supra note 140, at 73 (identifying reports that 
increasing demands on pharmacists lead to increased errors in their practices). 
 143. For cases in which the court expresses this concern, see, e.g., Fakhouri v. Taylor, 618 
N.E.2d 518, 521 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993); Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1385–
86 (Pa. 1991); Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); 
McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1051 (Wash. 1989). 
 144. See Smith, supra note 135, at 211–12 (discussing the trends in expanding education of 
pharmacists). 
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pharmacists and physicians” as they compete for an accurate and 
appropriate remedy for a patient’s medical condition.145 And while 
some courts believe a duty to warn would promote camaraderie and 
encourage pharmacists and physicians to work together,146 a rivalry is 
much more likely.147 
4. Increased Cost 
Exposing pharmacists to increased liability increases their costs of 
doing business because of the high litigation defense expenses. Costs 
of litigation naturally increase costs of health care—not only patients’ 
insurance rates,148 but also medical malpractice premiums.149 Those 
searching for answers have “targeted trial lawyers, accompanied by 
anecdotal allegations of frivolous lawsuits and run-away juries 
awarding outlandish judgments.”150  
 145. McKee, 782 P.2d at 1053 (deciding that this antagonism would result from 
pharmacists constantly questioning every prescription they fill). 
 146. See, e.g., Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ind. 1994) 
(positing that working together serves the best interests of the patient). 
 147. The same rivalry exists between physicians and pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
Physicians and pharmaceutical manufacturers are supposed to work together for the common 
good of the patients who use prescription drugs. The recent trend however, is quite the opposite. 
The pressure on physicians from litigious patients has become too much to bear; physicians are 
more willing to blame drug manufacturers than before. Physicians now assert claims against 
these manufacturers under several different theories of liability including economic loss, tort, 
consumer protection and deceptive trade practices, and other fraud and contract based claims. 
See generally Edward J. Sebold & John Q. Lewis, Physician Suits Against Pharmaceutical and 
Medical Device Manufacturers: Friend Turned Foe?, MEALEY’S EMERGING DRUGS AND 
DEVICES, July 20, 2002. 
 148. See Jeanne Schulte Scott, Malpractice Reform Is Dead; Long Live Malpractice 
Reform, 57 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 32 (2003) [hereinafter Scott, Malpractice]. In a recent 
report, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) found that losses from medical 
malpractice litigation, both in judgments and settlements, made up the largest part of insurers’ 
costs. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 16 (2003), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf. According to the GAO, these costs 
have been the primary cause of rate increases over the long run. Id. Jeanne Schulte Scott, a 
health care lobbyist in Washington D.C., suggests a solution: a true “no-fault” medical 
malpractice indemnity system which “needs to be resurrected from the ashes of the 1993 
Clinton health plan.” Scott, Malpractice, supra, at 32. While such drastic action may not be 
necessary, medical malpractice litigation reform remains a hot political topic and pharmacist 
liability for failure to warn plays a part in the discussion. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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IV. PROPOSAL 
The best way for courts to address a pharmacist’s liability for 
failing to warn patients of adverse effects of prescription drugs is to 
modify the general no-duty rule.151 In the United States, we refuse to 
impose liability for negligence where the alleged tortfeasor owes no 
duty to the injured party.152 For example, courts traditionally have 
held that there is no affirmative duty to rescue even if such rescue 
would not negatively affect the rescuer.153 
Pharmacists should have no general affirmative duty to warn;154 
however, pharmacists may assume a duty to warn by voluntarily 
counseling patients or by advertising an ability to detect and prevent 
the harmful effects of prescription drugs.155 This assumed duty would 
then subject pharmacists to negligence liability. Simply not warning a 
patient about a prescription’s adverse effects would be nonfeasance, 
for which no liability would be imposed.156 Affirmatively warning 
inadequately or incorrectly would be misfeasance, for which liability 
would be imposed.157 
Taking this proposal one step further, the standard of care to 
which pharmacists should be held once they assume the duty to warn 
a patient of the harmful effects of drugs should be a professional 
 151. This proposal, of course, presumes no statutory impediment to the court’s analysis. I 
advocate the same approach for the statutory duty as I do for the common law; however, the 
focus of this proposal is on the court’s approach to pharmacist liability for failure to warn. 
 152. Rudolph v. Arizona B.A.S.S. Fed’n, 898 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) 
(finding that a defendant who does not owe a duty to a plaintiff cannot be liable for the 
plaintiff’s injury even if the defendant acted negligently). 
 153. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding no 
general common law duty to rescue a stranger in distress, even absent any cost to the rescuer). 
Courts draw a distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance to reach this result. See John 
M. Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the 
Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, WIS. L. REV. 867, 
872 (1991) (“The common law’s reluctance to require one to render aid to a stranger rests upon 
the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.”) (footnote omitted). Misfeasance 
requires affirmative action while nonfeasance is simply failure to act. Section 314 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts similarly adopts this reasoning. 
 154. See discussion supra Part III for support of this notion. 
 155. In the future, courts may determine other methods by which pharmacists assume a 
duty to warn, but voluntary counseling and service advertising are the two most frequent ways 
courts have already recognized an assumed duty on the part of the pharmacist. 
 156. See supra note 153. 
 157. See id. 
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standard of care.158 This approach would liken pharmacists 
professionally to physicians, recognizing the industry’s professional 
progress, without allowing pharmacists to usurp the role of the 
physician. Courts could use industry custom and conduct to 
determine what should and should not have been done upon assuming 
the duty to warn.159 This method would also allow pharmacists and 
patients to make a choice regarding the type of pharmacist care they 
desire: if pharmacists wish to professionalize their practice, they must 
be willing to subject themselves to negligence liability; if patients 
desire professional pharmacist care, they must be willing to absorb 
the additional costs of the liability imposed on their pharmacists.160 
This modified general no-duty rule is a compromise between 
traditional common law immunity and modern common law 
increased liability. Such a doctrine keeps the pharmacist from 
interfering in the physician-patient relationship while maintaining the 
equilibrium between quality care and affordable cost in the health 
care system.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The pharmacists’ role in the health care industry continues to 
evolve as does the imposition of liability on pharmacists for failure to 
warn patients of the adverse effects of prescription drugs.161 The 
modern litigation trend finds more and more ways to hold a 
pharmacist liable for this failure to warn.162 To prevent interference in 
 158. Negligence law treats professionals differently than “non-professionals”. See 
generally DOMINICK VETRI ET AL., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 189–209 (2d ed. 2002). An 
example of the professional standard of care is “a degree of care, skill and proficiency exercised 
by reasonably careful, skillful, and prudent practitioners in the same class to which he belongs, 
acting under the same or similar circumstances.” Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 185, 186 (Ind. 
1992). 
 159. For professionals, custom sets the standard of care and deviation from that custom 
constitutes breach of duty. Custom evidence is conclusive in establishing the standard of care. 
See VETRI, supra note 158, at 189. 
 160. Regardless of this choice, prescribing physicians must still warn patients of a drug’s 
adverse effects and drug manufacturers must still provide package inserts. So, patients will still 
have two remaining sources for this information if they choose a non-professional pharmacist. 
 161. See Terence C. Green, Licking, Sticking, Counting, and Pouring—Is That All 
Pharmacists Do? McKee v. American Home Products Corp., 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1449, 
1474–75 (1991). 
 162. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.b. 
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the delicate physician-patient relationship and to prevent the 
unbalancing of the current health care system, this expanded liability 
must have limits. Through a modified general no-duty rule, 
pharmacists may still be held liable in negligence for duties they 
assume by voluntary counseling or by advertising their services. 
Meanwhile, pharmacists who cannot undertake these additional tasks 
face no fear of additional liability. The modified general no-duty rule 
is an adequate compromise. 
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